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Civil War in Syria 
External Actors and Interests as Drivers of Conflict 
Muriel Asseburg and Heiko Wimmen 
The armed conflict in Syria has accelerated in recent months. Both regime and rebels 
see themselves in a fight for survival that leaves no room for compromise. External 
supporters of both sides treat the conflict as a zero-sum game with far-reaching and, 
for some actors existential, consequences for their own strategic positions, and are 
therefore determined to prevent any outcome they would regard as disadvantageous. 
Their diplomatic, financial and in some cases military support fans the flames of con-
flict and strengthens the hand of hardliners on both sides. For the foreseeable future, 
there is good reason to expect that the conflict will be neither resolved politically nor 
won militarily. The priority for Europeans should be to stem the violence and support 
inclusive civilian structures; the latter could contribute to improving living conditions 
at the local level and counteracting radical and centrifugal tendencies. 
 
During recent months armed clashes 
between regime and rebels in Syria have 
escalated to a point where the two sides 
now see themselves fighting for physical 
survival. Both parties believe they can 
prevail militarily, and therefore reject any 
compromise. In November and December 
2012 the rebels made significant military 
gains. The regime has withdrawn from 
parts of its territory, and by late autumn 
2012 various rebel groups controlled vil-
lages, small towns, rural areas and strategic 
junctions in the south-west, the south-east 
and along the Lebanese and Turkish bor-
ders. Certain Kurdish areas in northern 
and north-eastern Syria are controlled by 
various parties working together in the 
Supreme Kurdish Council, among which 
the Democratic Union Party (Partiya Yeki-
tiya Demokrat, PYD), which emerged from 
the PKK in 2003, occupies a dominant posi-
tion. The PYD is working systematically to 
establish local structures of self-adminis-
tration and law and order, and for the 
moment rejects armed struggle against 
the Syrian regime. The PYD and the rebels 
of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) also control 
individual crossings along the Turkish 
border. (A regularly updated map show-
ing armed clashes and control of cities 
and border posts can be found at www. 
polgeonow.com/search/label/syria.) 
But the rebels have not yet succeeded 
in seizing complete and lasting control 
of larger swathes of territory or of any of 
the major cities. Damascus, Aleppo, Homs, 
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Hama and Deir al-Zor remain largely under 
the control of the regime. Nor are they 
able to protect the civilian population in 
the “liberated areas” against attacks by 
the regular army, and in particular the air 
force. Assad changed his tactics after the 
rebels launched offensives on Damascus 
and Aleppo in summer 2012. With the 
exception of the capital, the regime no 
longer attempts to recapture “liberated” 
quarters, instead causing large-scale de-
struction through heavy bombardment 
with artillery, rockets and warplanes. 
The impact on the civilian population is 
massive. In early December 2012 the Syrian 
Observatory for Human Rights put the 
number of deaths since the beginning of 
the uprising at more than 42,000, with tens 
of thousands more imprisoned or missed. 
By that time nearly half a million refugees 
had been registered or were awaiting regis-
tration by the UN in the four neighbouring 
countries of Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan and 
Iraq. That means that the number of regis-
tered refugees has more than tripled since 
August 2012. The real figures are very likely 
a good deal higher. The UNHCR expects 
that more than 700,000 people will have 
fled Syria by the end of the year, in addition 
to internal refugees estimated to number 
between 1.2 and 2 million. According to 
press reports, about 600,000 buildings 
had been destroyed by September 2012, in-
cluding many hospitals and other public 
institutions. Moreover, the regime has 
turned numerous hospitals and schools 
into prisons and torture centres. Industrial 
and agricultural production have almost 
completely collapsed as a result of sanc-
tions and fighting. 
In contested areas the state has largely 
stopped paying salaries and virtually 
ceased providing public services: medical 
treatment, schooling, public transport and 
waste collection. Some public functions 
have been taken over by local coordinating 
committees, revolutionary councils, chari-
ties and informal networks, with a remark-
able degree of self-organisation at the local 
level. Civilians and armed forces work to-
gether to maintain public order, supply the 
population with food and medicines, and 
organise protests. Access to these regions is 
heavily restricted, even for humanitarian 
organisations. The Syrian Red Crescent does 
not supply areas controlled by the rebels, 
leaving food, heating fuel and medicines in 
short supply there. 
At the same time there is a lack of inter-
locuters and clearly defined responsibilities 
on the rebel side. While they are organised 
in local military councils and increasingly 
also in regional brigades, until recently 
they had no central command structure to 
speak of. It remains to be seen whether the 
formation of a “Unified Supreme Military 
Council” composed mostly of field com-
manders with no formal military back-
ground and excluding some of the more 
prominent FSA leaders, announced in the 
Turkish city of Antalya in early December 
2012, will lead to better coordination or 
to more fragmentation. Moreover, a sig-
nificant proportion of the more radical 
Islamist brigades (such as Jabhat al-Nusra 
or Kata’ib Ahrar al-Sham) refuse to recog-
nise the authority of the councils and 
instead conduct operations on their own 
account, sometimes directly defying ex-
plicit instructions from the FSA leadership. 
Radicalisation and 
Confessionalisation 
The escalation of violence has accelerated 
radicalisation among the rebels, and the 
proportion of fighters with Salafist or jiha-
dist leanings has risen accordingly. And 
foreign jihadis are increasingly infiltrating 
into Syria. While these are more likely to 
number hundreds than thousands for the 
moment, the trend gives cause for concern 
as it goes hand in hand with a growing 
confessionalisation of the conflict spurred 
both by the regime and by the rebels’ 
external sponsors. The result is an increas-
ingly entrenched perception of a Sunni 
uprising (supported by the Sunni Gulf 
monarchies and Turkey) against an Alawite 
regime, those considered its local support-
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ers (Alawites and Christians) and its Shiite 
allies (Iran, Hezbollah, the Shiite-domi-
nated Iraqi government). Alawites and 
Christians in particular have come under 
increasing pressure to take one side or the 
other and fled their homes in mixed areas 
fearing rising crime and acts of retribution 
and revenge – especially as residential areas 
are increasingly hit by bombings.  
The Logic of War by Proxy 
The warring parties in Syria have been 
receiving increasingly open support from 
external actors. Above and beyond the 
internal power struggle, the conflict has 
acquired the character of a proxy war in 
which international, regional and subna-
tional conflicts are fought out. The actors 
here treat the conflict as a zero-sum game, 
where success for one is automatically a 
defeat for the other. 
One bone of contention is the interpre-
tation and enforcement of international 
norms, with the United States and other 
Western states backing the Syrian opposi-
tion while Russia and China support the 
Assad regime with trade and protection in 
the UN Security Council and, in the case of 
Russia, arms deliveries. Not least against 
the backdrop of their own attitude to pro-
democracy movements and minorities, 
Moscow and Beijing resist the application 
of the principle of international respon-
sibility to protect. In Russian-American rela-
tions there are also signs of rivalry over 
zones of influence echoing the patterns of 
the Cold War. 
But it is above all the conflict over Iran’s 
regional role that stokes the civil war in 
Syria. From the perspective of the Gulf 
States, first and foremost Saudi Arabia and 
Qatar, the Syria crisis offers an opportunity 
to reverse Tehran’s considerable growth 
in influence since the 2003 Iraq War and 
strengthen their own positions. The Syrian 
civil war has already undermined the stra-
tegic alliance between Iran and Hamas, 
with the latter resisting Iranian pressure to 
rally behind Assad and instead moving its 
headquarters from Damascus to Qatar’s 
capital Doha. This represents a severe set-
back for Tehran’s regional leadership 
aspirations, in which “Palestine” and the 
“liberation of Jerusalem” are central rally-
ing cries. At the same time, Iranian hopes 
of profiting from regime change in Egypt 
by forging a new alliance remain unful-
filled. Cairo had been one of Tehran’s most 
important regional adversaries since 1979. 
However, while the Iranian leadership pur-
sued a rapid rapprochement after the fall 
of Hosni Mubarak in February 2011, its en-
deavours have so far brought little change, 
not least due to incompatible positions in 
the Syria question. 
Israel has shown restraint, principally 
out of concern over spill-over effects: 
destabilisation of its border with Syria, the 
use of chemical weapons or Syria turning 
into a safe haven for al-Qaeda. But certain 
U.S. and Israeli strategists also see the 
Syrian civil war as an opportunity to deci-
sively weaken Iran, hoping that defeat in 
the Levant could force Tehran to give 
ground on other issues such as its nuclear 
programme. They also expect that the 
Lebanese Hezbollah would be weakened by 
regime change in Syria, which serves as its 
most important transit route for arms sup-
plies. Damascus also possesses strong in-
fluence over other Lebanese actors, which 
is a significant reason for Hezbollah’s dis-
proportionate strength in the country’s 
power structures. If Assad falls, thus the 
calculation, the risks associated with an 
attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities would 
also diminish, especially in relation to 
possible Syrian or Hezbollah retribution 
against Israel. Regime change in Syria 
would thus enhance the credibility of 
military threats towards Tehran. 
On the other side, Iran regards the 
power struggle in Damascus (like the inter-
national sanctions against the Islamic Re-
public) as an element of a U.S.- and Israeli-
driven policy of isolation that ultimately 
seeks regime change in Tehran. The Ira-
nian leadership sees itself at the forefront 
of a strategic/ideological conflict about 
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nothing less than liberating the region 
from U.S. and Israeli hegemony. Iran there-
fore supports the Syrian regime with mili-
tary advisers, financial transfers and energy 
supplies, while the rebels receive political 
and logistical support from Western actors 
like France, the United States and Turkey, 
and financial and military aid from the 
Gulf States. 
In Syria’s unstable neighbours Iraq and 
Lebanon, government and opposition sup-
port opposing sides in the Syrian conflict – 
rhetorically, financially and by sending 
combatants. While the Lebanese Hezbollah 
and the Iraqi government stand by the 
Syrian regime, Sunni politicians in Lebanon 
and Sunni tribes and jihadist groups in Iraq 
support the rebels. Here again the logic of 
confessional mobilisation is at work. The 
fighting has repeatedly spilled over into 
Iraq and Lebanon. In October 2012 Lebanon 
was shaken by days of armed clashes after 
the high-ranking Sunni intelligence officer 
Wissam al-Hassan was killed in a car bomb-
ing, with some Sunni groups even operat-
ing under the FSA flag. In mid-November 
fighting broke out between Sunni Salafist 
groups and Hezbollah in the southern 
Lebanese port city of Sidon. In early Decem-
ber, the death of a dozen youths from the 
northern hub of Tripoli, who were on their 
way to join the rebels inside Syria, reignited 
violence between Alawi and Sunni quarters. 
In Iraq too, the number of bombings has 
increased considerably in recent months. 
As host to the opposition Syrian National 
Council and operating base of the FSA, Tur-
key became a party to the conflict at an 
early stage and today finds itself directly 
threatened by developments. First, it has 
repeatedly been directly affected by fight-
ing along the border, with potential of 
escalation. In early October the Turkish 
parliament authorised military operations 
including the possibility of entering Syrian 
territory. While Turkish politicians have 
been talking about a no-fly-zone or buffer 
zone for some time, the Turkish population 
overwhelmingly rejects any intervention. 
In early December, NATO approved the 
Turkish request to deploy Patriot anti-
missile systems at the border. Second, the 
presence of mostly Sunni refugees and 
rebels in the border area causes problems 
with the local Arab Alawite population 
who feel threatened by the rebels, resentful 
towards the refugees, and in some cases 
sympathise with the Assad regime. Third, 
in light of the unresolved Kurdish question 
in Turkey, Ankara fears that another auton-
omous Kurdish region (alongside the one in 
northern Iraq) could arise immediately 
across the border and reinvigorate separat-
ist tendencies in its own population, espe-
cially as PKK attacks within Turkey have 
significantly increased in recent months. 
War and Diplomacy 
External supporters of both regime and 
opposition thus see the conflict in Syria 
having far-reaching, in some cases even 
existential implications for their own stra-
tegic positions and long-term political 
objectives. They are therefore likely to 
continue expending considerable effort 
to prevent what they would regard as an 
undesirable outcome. Accordingly, the 
adversaries in Syria can for the foreseeable 
future count on a continuous (and in the 
case of the opposition: growing) flow of 
money and arms. Significant military suc-
cesses for one side are likely to lead almost 
automatically to an intensification of sup-
port for the other. This makes it unlikely 
that the civil war will be decided militarily 
any time soon. Instead it must be feared 
that the extent and intensity of the fighting 
and the numbers of casualties and refugees 
will increase yet further, at least in the 
short term. 
In recent months the violence has al-
ready noticeably worsened, deepening the 
rifts between the parties and diminishing 
yet further the chances of achieving a politi-
cal solution by way of negotiations. The 
increasing involvement of external actors 
further reduces that prospect. To these 
actors, the initiation of a process that does 
not reliably lead their respective clientele 
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to power – or keep the other side out – is 
in itself a strategic defeat. 
Consequently, prominent Western 
leaders like U.S. Secretary of State Hillary 
Clinton and French President François 
Hollande have declared that President 
Assad must relinquish power as a precondi-
tion for any political process. This stands in 
clear contradiction to the Geneva Commu-
niqué of 30 June 2012, nominally also sup-
ported by Washington and Paris, which 
calls amongst other things for a cease-fire 
and the formation of a transitional gov-
ernment involving regime and opposition, 
to initiate a political transition. In mid-
November France, Turkey and the states 
of the Gulf Cooperation Council explicitly 
recognised the National Coalition of Syrian 
Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (or: 
Syrian National Coalition), founded in 
Doha under massive external pressure, as 
the sole legitimate representative of the 
Syrian people, and the EU foreign ministers 
expressed their agreement with this line. 
On the other side Russia, China and Iran 
have proposed a “dialogue” involving the 
present rulers. Such initiatives are clearly 
designed to shore up the Assad regime’s 
legitimacy by co-opting individual oppo-
sition figures – in essence to preserve the 
regime’s monopoly of power. With no room 
for compromise between these opposing 
stances, diplomatic initiatives presently 
enjoy practically no prospect of success. 
That applies for example to the efforts of 
the joint envoy of the UN and the Arab 
League, Lakhdar Brahimi, to revive the 
Geneva agreement. Similar initiatives by 
Russia serve above all to shift blame for 
the political impasse to the other camp. 
Finally, the confrontational stance of 
the external actors strengthens the position 
of the hardliners within both camps. Al-
though opposition figures seeking to start a 
political process in the country certainly 
do exist, for example around the National 
Coordination Committee for Democratic 
Change or the Building the Syrian State 
movement, they run up against obstacles 
on all sides. Not only are they confronted 
with repression by the regime, but also 
with the firm rejection of other opposition 
forces, such as the Syrian National Council, 
which feel their stance is backed by their 
external hosts and donors. This also dimin-
ishes the incentives for potentially com-
promise-willing regime loyalists to think 
about political alternatives. So change 
initiated from within the regime becomes 
even more unlikely. The polarisation of 
society and the violence of the clashes also 
reduce the likelihood of regime collapse or 
a coup attempt. Instead the ranks are clos-
ing and more moderate actors are driven 
abroad or sidelined. 
No End of Conflict in Sight 
There is currently no legal basis for a mili-
tary intervention, and the UN Security 
Council is unlikely to pass a corresponding 
resolution. And anyway, the actors that 
would be capable of such a complex and 
highly risky military operation (first and 
foremost the United States) have to date 
shown no willingness to do so. Because 
the logic of war by proxy described above 
makes a military victory for one side just as 
unlikely as a negotiated solution, a con-
tinuation of the civil war must be expected. 
In the short term, resources flowing to 
the regime’s opponents are likely to remain 
fragmented, because their external spon-
sors are pursuing diverging interests. This 
hampers efforts to unite political opposi-
tion and rebels and establish central com-
mand structures and civilian oversight. At 
the same time, Iranian and Russian support 
notwithstanding, armed struggle and sanc-
tions will further erode the regime’s re-
sources, and the disintegration of state con-
trol and institutions is likely to accelerate 
even in regions the regime nominally 
holds. As one of the consequences, Damas-
cus can be expected to successively lose 
control over the Shabiha paramilitaries 
fighting on its side, especially if it can no 
longer pay them. In that case the Shabiha 
are likely to seek substitute resources of 
their own through looting, kidnapping and 
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informal taxation, with an increasing risk 
of infighting. 
Syria is thus heading for a period in 
which so-called warlords wield power and 
violence increases further as autonomous 
paramilitary units fight for influence and 
territorial control. With the ethnic/con-
fessional dimension simultaneously gain-
ing in importance, there must be concern 
that systematic killing or displacement of 
“enemy” population groups could occur, 
comparable with the “ethnic cleansing” 
of the Yugoslav civil wars. 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
No viable conflict resolution will be pos-
sible until the parties cease pursuing out-
right military victory and the interest of 
decisive regional and international actors 
in this (proxy) war has been exhausted. 
However, there is currently no realistic 
prospect of finding agreement on even just 
one of the major conflicts playing out in 
Syria: the struggle over regional leadership 
and influence, the Iranian nuclear pro-
gramme, rivalry between the United States 
and Russia/China, the Kurdish question, 
etc. Instead it must be feared that an esca-
lation of the Iranian nuclear conflict to 
military confrontation, for example, would 
intensify the civil war in Syria. 
In this situation Europeans should seek 
above all to prevent any further escalation 
of violence, to improve living conditions 
at the local level, and to counteract radical 
and centrifugal tendencies. Additionally 
humanitarian aid must be urgently ex-
panded. 
Involve all external actors: As long as it 
remains in Iran’s interests to strengthen 
the hardliners in Damascus, efforts to seek 
a negotiated solution are doomed. But Ira-
nian cooperation remains unlikely as long 
as the signs are pointing to escalation over 
the nuclear conflict, for example through 
the tightening of sanctions against Tehran. 
The EU-3 (Germany, France and the United 
Kingdom) should encourage the United 
States and Iran to reach an understanding 
in the nuclear question, for example 
through direct bilateral talks. At the same 
time European governments should lean 
on Iran and Israel to refrain from esca-
latory rhetoric and war preparations. They 
should also continue to seek constructive 
approaches that could change Russia’s posi-
tion. One starting point could be to involve 
Moscow more closely in decisions about 
NATO’s missile defence system. 
Contain conflict and reduce violence: 
All support for the rebels should be care-
fully assessed for its impact on escalation 
or de-escalation. This applies above all to 
supplying heavy weaponry. The establish-
ment of “safe zones” has been demanded 
by many, but could actually escalate the 
violence rather than effectively protecting 
the Syrian population. Such a step would 
not only mean direct military involvement 
of external actors, but would also endanger 
the resident population if the zones became 
staging points and refuges for rebel forces. 
Air power, for example Patriot missiles 
stationed in Turkey, will hardly suffice to 
properly secure safe zones. The rebels 
should also be discouraged as far as pos-
sible from conducting operations in popu-
lated areas as long as they are unable to 
effectively protect the civilian population. 
Turkey should be clearly warned against 
using the presence of forces close to the 
PKK as an excuse to intervene militarily 
in Syria’s Kurdish areas, not least because 
such an intervention would destabilise a 
region where the civilian population is still 
comparatively safe. 
A comprehensive cease-fire remains un-
likely without a political process supported 
by all the parties. Priority should there-
fore be given to mediation efforts working 
towards partial cease-fires and initiatives 
to reduce violence at the local level. Euro-
peans should work to modify Brahimi’s 
mission in this direction. 
Immunise neighbouring states: The 
Syrian civil war is already having a destabi-
lising effect on Iraq and Lebanon. Europe-
ans should work with the supporters of op-
position and regime to avoid any steps that 
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would worsen that trend. It would, for ex-
ample, be counterproductive to urge Iraq 
and Lebanon to take sides in the civil war, 
to allow their territory to be used for operat-
ing bases or arms transit, or to instrumen-
talise Syrian refugees in these countries as 
a pool for rebel recruitment, or to conceal 
the transfer of arms and combatants. 
Urge inclusiveness of political opposi-
tion: Efforts to overcome divisions within 
the Syrian opposition should be supported. 
The founding of the Syrian National Coali-
tion in mid-November in Doha was a step in 
the right direction. 
For any future transitional government, 
having a composition that exactly reflects 
the political, confessional and ethnic forces 
in the country will be less important than 
communicating and cooperating with the 
emerging structures of local self-adminis-
tration in territories “liberated” by rebels 
or abandoned by the regime. It is also im-
portant that a transitional government 
engage constructively with opposition 
groups operating in regime-controlled 
regions that have so far refused to join the 
Doha Coalition. The documents outlining 
a vision for Syria drawn up by opposition 
groups in July 2012 in Cairo could offer a 
basis for this. A transitional government 
should also ensure that Syrians who – for 
whatever reason – do not identify with 
the uprising nonetheless see a future for 
themselves in the country. 
Unify the military opposition: Clear 
responsibilities, central command struc-
tures and civilian oversight of rebel forces 
are essential to counteract fragmentation 
and warlordism. At the same time the 
rebels must be urged to observe inter-
national humanitarian law. Those states 
that supply logistical and military support 
to the rebels, some of which are close allies 
of Europeans, will be in the best position to 
exercise influence; Europeans should seek 
to influence them accordingly. It is impor-
tant to ensure that non-state networks sup-
porting the opposition, especially in the 
Gulf States, also sign up to the goals of such 
a joint strategy. 
Support local structures: After the end 
of the civil war it will be essential to curtail 
the influence of military actors and mend 
the fractures torn through society. One im-
portant precondition for success in this 
endeavour is the strengthening of emerg-
ing structures of local self-organisation and 
the restriction of the FSA and other rebel 
groups to a strictly military role. Even in 
areas still controlled by the regime, oppor-
tunities, albeit often precarious, for politi-
cal activity have opened up. Here too, the 
prospects for peaceful coexistence after the 
end of the regime will improve if alterna-
tive and integrative political structures can 
be established. Europeans should support 
such local structures to ease the living con-
ditions of the population and create a basis 
for the post-Assad era. However, care must 
be taken not to worsen fragmentation by 
infecting local structures with donor rival-
ries. From this point of view close coordina-
tion is key, for example through a mecha-
nism in the context of the Friends of Syria 
group. 
Humanitarian aid: Especially in the 
regions controlled by the rebels and the 
PYD there is an urgent need to supply 
humanitarian aid to the resident popula-
tion and internally displaced people: food, 
shelter, heating fuel, medical services, etc. 
While it will not be possible to avoid co-
operating with armed rebels and local 
strongmen in the delivery of aid, the top 
priority must be to strengthen the respon-
sibility and authority of emerging local 
structures of civilian self-administration 
and self-organisation. 
Beyond that, assistance for Turkey, 
Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq, as the states 
accepting the largest numbers of Syrian 
refugees, should be stepped up, as should 
support for the UNHCR, whose work is 
already severely underfunded. Otherwise 
humanitarian crisis threatens, and an 
escalation of distributive conflicts in the 
host countries. European countries should 
also allow victims with complicated in-
juries to be treated in Europe regardless 
of ethnicity or religion. 
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